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Second, the term human security does not require a limitation to individual migration triggering conflict situations, rather it allows the perception of a ‘conflict continuum’22 in which the transitions between peaceful conflict solutions and violent conflicts are fluid. If the con flicts, which can occur in such varying forms as competition, rivalry, tension or violent con flicts, are solved peacefully, the ideal condition of a cooperative overcoming of conflict is achieved, and there is human security. On the other hand, if the actors involved are incapa ble of reaching a consensus through negotiation, there can be violent clashes and thus hu man insecurity.
This concept of a graduated conflict continuum is better suited to the compilation of migra tion-caused security risks than the commonly used dichotomy of war and peace. For one thing, empirical migration research shows again and again that migrants and refugees are driven primarily through subjectively perceived insecurity and less through objectively exist ing security deficits. People react to pressure factors individually and in groups in a variety of ways, which also explains why, in many violent conflicts, there are only a few refugees, al though the pressure for displacement is great. On the other hand, migration-related conflicts are not static conditions, but rather they demonstrate a dynamic that is largely determined by the ability and will of the participants to settle such conflicts. Thus, there are numerous ex amples in which conflicts over the use of scarce water resources, aggravated by migration, have led to cooperative conflict solutions, but so far have led to violent conflict in water shortages only in very isolated cases.23 Third, by using the term human security, different levels on which this security can be threat ened by migration-caused conflicts can be distinguished.
Thus on the macro level of nations, conflicts arise between countries of origin, transit and reception. This is the case, for example, when the governments cannot achieve a consensus on the form of border control or on their migration policy interests, such as when the coun tries of origin relieve their labour markets through emigration and their public revenues Cf. Steffen Angenendt, Klimaflüchtlinge, in: Steffen Angenendt und Susanne Dröge (eds.), Klimawandel und Sicherheit, (forthcoming).
Cf. Ibrahim Sirkeci, Transnational mobility and conflict, in: Migration Letters, vol. 6, No. 1, April 2009, pp. 3-14 F or this, cf. i.a. Dirk Messner, Klimawandel und Wasserkrisen der Zukunft, in: Entwicklung und Frieden, No.
3, 2009, pp. 167-173.
through remittances from migrants, but the recipient countries are not interested in immigra tion and are not cooperative in this regard.
On the meso level of group relations, such conflicts can result when local population groups regard immigrants as competitors for scarce resources and infrastructure or feel their cultural identity threatened by them. Thus in Ghana in 2001, there were clashes between Liberian refugees and the local population due to the competition for scarce resources. Something similar can also be observed in Tanzania, where an estimated 320,000 refugees from neighbouring states have become long-term settlers. In Cote d’Ivoire, the hostility toward refugees based in the nationalistic concept of ‘ivorité’ even contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in September 2002.24 In addition, immigrant groups can feel discriminated against by the majority population due to their origin, culture or religion, they can be socially margin alised and live geographically separated (so-called ‘parallel societies’), and conflicts can break out, for example, over gender roles, religious behaviour or cultural practices. These problems are demonstrated, for example, in the difficult integration of Kurdish refugees from Iraq in northern Syria or even in Turkey. Migration-caused social tensions, as in Jordan, are aggravated by competition for overburdened infrastructure and scarce jobs.
On the micro level of individual contacts, conflicts arise primarily when immigrants become victims of xenophobic or racist violence, or when locals suffer from crime associated with immigration. The former, for example, could recently be observed in the treatment of immi grants in South Africa.
However, conflicts arise not only on the individual conflict levels, but also between different conflict levels when the individual parties have incompatibly different interests. Thus – with a view to the countries of origin – a governmental oppression of ethnic minorities can drive them out as a group (conflict between macro and meso levels) or gender-specific role con cepts altered by the migration process can lead to conflicts in the families of origin (conflict between meso and micro levels).
Two conclusions can be drawn from these threats to human security caused by migration movements.
1. In the analysis of migration-related security risks, the focus must be on the risks for hu man security, for ultimately, migrations (independent of the form in which they occur) are processes in which the migrants and refugees must deal with a frequently difficult deci sion between staying and going. However, because migration also represents political challenges for the affected countries and neighbouring states, the risks for national and regional security must be analysed in addition to human security aspects.
2. The security consequences of migration vary widely depending on the focus of the analy sis. In particular, there are significant differences between countries of origin and recep tion, as well as special conflict situations in the transit countries. As noted at the begin ning, the security policy debate to date has dealt primarily with the consequences for the industrialised nations and less with the analysis of the consequences for developing na tions. In addition, analyses for countries of transit are also lacking, which is problematic, because an increasing number of migrants are remaining there for a longer time or even permanently due to a lack of options for further migration. Some states in North Africa, for example, now house a significant number of (irregular) migrants, who want to migrate to 24 Cf. Paul-Simon Handy, Security Implications and Development Opportunities of Migration: A regional study of West Africa. p. 6.
the EU, but find no opportunity to do so and can cause conflicts in the transit countries.
From these two aspects (dimensions of security and country types), a typology of migration caused security risks in developing nations can be compiled, in which the individual security risks can be placed (Fig. 1). This typology – as with any attempt at categorisation in complex processes – cannot be selective. However, it can point out where countries of origin, transit and destination are confronted with similar migration-caused security risks, and which risks therefore require particular political attention in which countries.
In reference to this typology and the designation of individual conflict patterns, it must once again be emphasised that this study deals only with the identification of potential risks. The manifold chances which are associated with migrations and which outweigh the security risks in many cases, are evident, but – as noted at the outset – not the subject of this analysis.
The typology shows, among other things, where common migration-related security risks exist for countries of origin, transit and reception. There are five common problem areas, each with specific risks for national, regional and human security.
1. First, uncontrolled migration represents a risk for all nations involved. The risks are greatest for poorer countries of reception. Here, refugees and migrants compete with the local population for especially scarce resources and infrastructure, and with extensive immigration, an initial willingness of the local population to assist the newcomers can turn into rejection, if they feel exploited. Examples of this are numerous; one current case is the refugee movement in recent years from Iraq to Syria and Jordan. It cannot be ruled out that violent conflicts may arise out of such competitive situations.25 There is much to indicate that, in future, the number of complex humanitarian catastro phes will increase in the least developed countries. Therefore, it is to be expected that these countries will have even greater difficulties than thus far in overcoming situations in which violent clashes, economic adversity, overpopulation and man-made environmental catastrophes coincide.
2. Additionally, many countries of origin, transit and reception commonly perceive irregular immigration as threatening.26 Here, the perception of security is a social construct which influences the acceptance of immigration, depending on the economic situation, the already existant demographic heterogeneity, the scope and the ethnic-cultural affiliation of the immigrants. 27 Especially this form of uncontrolled immigration can exacerbate already existing pressures on infrastructure, supply systems and employment opportunities. In particular, there is a danger that there will be competition between migrants and the na tive population for jobs or scarce resources. Thus, for example, Nigeria deported ap proximately two million migrants in the mid-1980s due to a rapid deterioration in the sup ply situation.
In addition, there may be a threat – perceived by the population – to the cultural or na tional identity and social cohesion. Xenophobic acts of violence, such as were seen for the first time in South Africa in recent years, may be the result.28 Migration will be per ceived as a security risk, particularly when the immigration of a large number of refugees amplifies already extant latent interethnic conflicts and could have an effect on the politi cal balance of power. Thus in 1999, Macedonia resisted the acceptance of KosovarAlbanian civil war refugees and justified this resistance with a possible destabilisation of the ethnic balance in the country. Similar examples can be seen with Iraqi Kurds in Tur key or Syria and Afghan Sunnis in Shiite-influenced Pakistan. This can result in risks to internal stability, for example through an escalation of existing latent ethnic conflicts, such Cf. Steffen Angenendt und Muriel Asseburg, Die irakische Flüchtlingskrise. Ein regionales Sicherheitsrisiko, in: Internationale Politik, January 2008, pp. 52-57.
Cf. C. Rudolph, National Security and Immigration. Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945, Stanford 2006, p. 268.
Cf. Myron Weiner, Security,Stability and International Migration, in: id. (ed.), International Migration and Secu rity, Boulder 1993, pp. 1-35; Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum, Political Demography, Demographic En gineering. New York, Oxford 2001, p. 146.
Cf. Barry Buzan, Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization, in: Ole Waever et al. (ed.), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London 1993, S. 41-57; Dave Coleman, Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition, in: Population and Development Review, No. 3, 2006, pp. 401-446.
as recently in Cote d’Ivoire.29 Furthermore, relations with the countries of origin and tran sit can be strained.
In general, immigration can have a variety of effects on the internal security of nations. It can impact this security if it is inadequately controlled, immigrants are not integrated, there is an increase in xenophobia and political extremism due to unresolved integration problems or irregular immigration and human trafficking lead to associated crime.
3. With respect to immigrant-related crime, the crime statistics of those states which have the appropriate documentation regularly show higher levels of crime for the immigrant population than the native population. However, because most statistics only record citi zenship, they only allow a distinction between citizens and aliens. The ‘crime by foreign ers’ thus determined is often assessed as an indicator for the threat to internal security by immigrants, and is the subject of domestic political debates in many countries. Thus, complaints by the Ghanaian population over increasing crime and prostitution led to re strictive measures against Liberian refugees.
In every country, the share of foreign suspects in organised crime and human trafficking is especially high. Both areas are frequently interlinked and the same organisations and personnel are involved, merely with other goods, namely not weapons or drugs, but hu man beings. Irregular immigrants are exposed to particular risks here, because they are vulnerable due to their lack of legal status. There are also many well-documented cases of exploitation and slavery in developing nations. For West Africa, for example, it is as sumed that between 200,000 and 300,000 people annually are the victim of human traf ficking.30 Many countries are primarily concerned here by subsequent crime in connection with smuggling. Connections with organised crime are also frequently seen in the financ ing of weapons sales for rebel groups, as, for example, in Somalia.
4. Another risk of immigration is the political extremism of immigrants. This is usually under stood as membership in organisations whose efforts are opposed to the security of the affected country or endanger the foreign interests of the country through acts of violence.
Often, extremist-militant groups become involved as aides for people in refugee situa tions and attempt to mobilise them for their goals. This can extend up to the recruitment of people willing to engage in terror, such as with some violent Islamistic groups in Paki stan. Generally, any immigration from areas of tension can aggravate the problems of po litical extremism.31 It cannot be ruled out that extremists will use a stay as tourists or asy lum seekers to prepare violent actions in their country of origin.
Finally, there is also the risk of home-grown terrorism. Kenya, for example, has for years considered itself exposed to a direct threat by Somali refugees, who have been in Kenya a long time, but are recruited again and again by Somali extremists for terror plans. In the Sahel, the terrorist group Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active and try to re cruit for their activities, particularly among refugees. Jordan suffered the painful experi ence that the open-door policy practised until 2006 first made attacks possible.
5. Finally, the external security of countries of origin, transit and reception can also be threatened by migration movements. In the case of mass and uncontrolled immigration, Cf. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley 1985; Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, 2. ed., Boulder 2004.
30 Cf. Handy, op. cit. (n. 23), p. 6.
Cf. Juris Pupcenoks, Migration of Violence, Presentation at the 50th annual conference of the International Studies Association, New York, 15-18 Feb.2009 (unpublished MS) the inability to control one’s own borders means a loss of territorial sovereignty for the na tion.32 However, such a direct security risk is only conceivable in a crisis-laden mass refugee movement. Such refugee movements have occurred in past decades, for exam ple, in eastern Africa, particularly in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. However, indi rect effects are more frequent on the external security of reception countries. This in cludes, above all, three aspects.33 First, migrations can have indirect effects on the relations between countries of origin and reception. Thus, in August 2009, there was a sudden break in diplomatic relations be tween Iraq and Syria, after Iraq officially accused Syria of not adequately preventing at tacks planned by Iraqi refugees living there.
The similar occurred between Tanzania and Burundi around the turn of the millennium.