«Berlin, September 2010 Foto auf dem Cover: Internally displaced persons in a tent camp in Girdassen, Dahuk gov ernorate in Iraq. © IOM 2007 (Photo: ...»
South-South migration in the global context According to an estimate by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of migrants worldwide has increased from 154.8 million to over 200 million people since 1990.2 This increase has affected all regions of the world, but in a variety of ways. In recent years, the growth has occurred primarily in developed countries: in 1990, 53.2 percent of all mi grants and refugees lived there, but in 2005 it was already 60.5 percent. In this period, 33 million people migrated to these countries. The less developed states, on the other hand, lost shares in the international migration, their percentage dropping from 46.8 to 39.5 percent.3 Nevertheless, also these countries recorded significant immigration. According to the UN Population Division, South-South movements in 2005 made up approximately one third of the global migration, a share as large as that of the South-North migration. In addition, there is substantial internal migration within developing countries, with large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Currently, their number is estimated at 24.5 million people. In total, in 2005, some 75 million migrants and refugees lived in the less developed states, 53 million of them in Asia, 17 million in Africa and 7 million in Latin America and the Caribbean.4 It is to be expected that migration will continue to increase not only in the industrialised coun tries, but also in the developing nations.
Migration and development
With economic globalisation and the accompanying opening of borders for migration, a ‘global demographic system’5 has arisen, in which migration functions as a compensating factor for economic, demographic, social and political inequalities and a lack of develop ment.6 Migration may represent an individual, family or group strategy in order to escape poor or unsatisfactory living conditions and improve perspectives. However, national migration re Cf. International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2008. Managing Labour Migration in the Evolving Global Economy, Geneva 2008, pp. 2-3.
Cf. for this and the following data (unless otherwise indicated) UN DESA, International Migration Report 2006:
A Global Assessment, New York 2009.
United Nations General Assembly, International migration and development. Report of the Secretary-General, New York 2006, p. 12.
Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London (forthcoming).
Cf. Wenke Apt, Steffen Angenendt, Demografie – Einfluss auf die Sicherheit, in: Bundesakademie für Sicher heitspolitik (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen. Ergänzungsband II, 2009, pp. 275-307.
gimes significantly limit international mobility and freedom of movement. Although many countries are dependent on immigrants and have a substantial need for immigrants,7 they invest significant resources in the control of their external borders and limiting migration movements, because they fear that large, uncontrolled immigration could cause internal con flicts.8 Often, only very serious economic or political pressure causes people to seek migra tion or refuge, an important reason why migrants and refugees currently make up no more than 3 percent of the world’s population. Because only those migrants and refugees who have the necessary resources emigrate to other countries, these people generally do not belong to the poorest and least educated sections of their homeland’s population. All of these characteristics of migration movements have implications for development policy.
Since the publication of the Global Commission on International Migration’s report in 2005,9 the studies by the World Bank on the significance of remittances10 and the recommendations by the OECD for development-oriented migration policies in 200711, the scientific and political interest in the contribution of migrants to development has grown. This aspect of migration has also been emphasised in the 2009 Human Development Report.12 In the meantime, there is frequently talk of ‘triple win’ situations, in which countries of origin, recipient countries and the migrants themselves benefit from migration. In addition, the World Bank regularly indicates that the scope of global remittances has exceeded public development aid (in some developing countries even the total of public development aid and direct foreign investment) and thus is possibly more important for development than traditional public-funded develop ment aid.13 The activities of diasporas are occasionally helpful for the development of the countries of origin, but sometimes also irrelevant or even a hindrance, and the effect of return depends not only on how much and what capital the migrants bring back, but also on their successful reintegration in the local labour market.14 Recently therefore, development policy instruments have been increasingly sought in order to make better use of the potential of return mi grants.15 In the search for political instruments, it is useful to consider the connection between migra tion and development. In an ideal cycle of migration and development, three aspects or phases can be defined, which influence the developmental effect of migration in a variety of ways and in which specific political instruments can be used in order to improve the effect of development and to avoid conflicts caused by migration: the migration process, the condi tions in the country of reception and the effect of migration on the migrants themselves.
Cf. UNFPA, Migration Wall Sheet, New York, 2008.
Cf. Steffen Angenendt, Irreguläre Migration als internationales Problem. Probleme, Risiken, Optionen, SWPStudie, December 2007.
Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for ac tion, Berlin 2005.
For example: Dilip Ratha, Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance, in: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance, pp. 157-175.
Cf. OECD, Policy Coherence for Development. Migration and Developing Countries, Paris 2007.
12 Cf. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2009 - Overcoming barri ers: Human mobility and development, 2009. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009 Cf. e.g. World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, Migration and Devel opment Brief, No. 10, July 2009.
Cf. OECD 2007, pp. 53-108 Cf. Laura Chappell, Alex Glennie, Maximising the Development Outcomes Of Migration: A policy perspec tive, IPPR, London 2009, p. 5 In regard to the first aspect, the migration process, the promotion of circular migration, for example, can stimulate development, when the receiving countries fill the gaps in their labour markets and the countries of origin benefit from remittances and knowledge transfer from returnees.16 Similarly, the fight against human trafficking can also back up development pol icy, because these migrants usually cannot use their knowledge and abilities due to their uncertain legal position and dire situation and, in this way, their potential development contri bution remains unused.
With regard to the second area, the legal and integration policy conditions in the respective receiving country, the conditions of entry and residence determine what development contri bution the migrants can afford. This affects the de jure and de facto immigration options, as well as access to the labour market. Also important is the legal protection, particularly in terms of labour law, which the migrants find, for this determines whether migrants can em ploy their knowledge. In addition to this, the education and training policies of the country of origin and thus the qualification of the migrants, as well as the training and further education policies of the country of reception represent important general parameters for the economic success of the migrants in the country of reception. The similar is true for the receiving coun try’s cooperation with migrant organisations and the offers of political participation and the acquisition of citizenship. Support from their own organisations can improve the integration of migrants, as can an active integration policy in general, which aims to improve the opportuni ties for the participation of migrants in the core areas of integration (labour market, educa tion, political participation), helping migrants to make better use of their potential.17 Finally, the third area, the results of the migration process, produces in many places oppor tunities for political action in order to improve the development effects of migrations and to avoid conflicts. Thus, remittances can be simplified and made less expensive, diasporas can be supported in planned investments in their countries of origin, and short-term or permanent returnees can be supported organisationally or even financially, so that they can set up their own business in their country of origin. Up to now, this approach has been practically imple mented, for example, in the return programmes for refugees of UNHCR in Liberia, the Bal kans and most recently in northern Iraq.
In general, it is important that migration might have security implications in all above mentioned areas, and that development policy might at least partially influence whether these effects are positive or negative and whether national, regional or human security is endangered in the countries of origin, transit and reception. These risks are considered in more detail below.
Cf. Steffen Angenendt, Zirkuläre Migration. Ein tragfähiges migrationspolitisches Konzept?, SWP-Aktuell 2007/A 27, Berlin, April 2007, Fritjof Zerger, Migrationssteuerung und Entwicklungseffekte durch zirkuläre Migration?, in: Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-5.
Cf. Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration, Migration und Integration – Erfahrungen nutzen, Neues wagen. Jahresgutachten des Sachverständigenrates, Berlin 2004.
Migration and security in developing countries
Some security risks of migration are obvious. Thus, a large-scale and unplanned immigration can overstretch the reception capacity of the destination countries and lead to internal ten sions and violent conflicts. In addition, the emigration of qualified people (brain drain) can have harmful consequences for the local and national economy, and larger immigrations in structurally weak areas can weaken the local infrastructures so that competition for scarce goods increases and violent conflicts become more likely. These, in turn, can endanger the security of the affected countries and neighbouring states and cause third-party states to react politically or, in extreme cases, even militarily.
Such migration-related security risks have been dealt with repeatedly in recent decades.18 However, the debate has exhibited three prominent weaknesses. First, it has been held pre dominantly from the view of security policy, but not development policy. The initiators were primarily security policy actors, whose main interests were the identification of potential new (military) risks, such as the challenges for border security or humanitarian interventions to avoid destabilisation.19 Second, the analyses refer predominantly to the migration-related risks for the industrialised nations, i.e. to South-North migration. The security implications of South-South migration and the effects on developing countries received significantly less attention. Third, the focus of these analyses was mostly on the risks to national security, es pecially the question of the circumstances under which uncontrolled and irregular immigra tions could endanger national sovereignty, the ability of national institutions to function and domestic stability. Less consideration was given to aspects of human security and the effects of migration on the opportunities for migrants and their families.20 As part of the analysis of migration-related security risks for developing countries, on the other hand, three dimensions are of particular importance. First, in the root cause analysis, migration should be considered as a consequence of insecurity. Furthermore, the security problems resulting from migration in the receiving countries and regions of the South must be investigated. Finally, the reintegration of refugees and migrants in the countries of origin can also lead to conflicts. In all three cases, particular attention must be given to the security of the migrants and refugees themselves.
Since the early 1990s, the concept of ‘human security’ has gained importance in the interna tional security and international relations debate. In contrast to the traditional, state-focussed understanding of security, this view places the focus on individuals and population groups and, alongside military risks, also analyses non-military risks which could contribute to the insecurity of people. Such risks appear in extremely varying forms (poverty, oppression, envi ronmental degradation, epidemics), and their causes are commensurately manifold (e.g.
globalisation, population development or climate change). The concept is indispensable for the explanation and analysis of migration-caused security risks in three regards.
First, with the help of the term human security, migration and refuge can be conceptualised as a search for security and stability. Normally in the analysis of migration movements, push F or an overview, cf. i.a. Myron Weiner, International Migration and Security, Boulder 1993; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, London 1991; Nazli Choucri, Migration and Security. Some Key Linkages, in: Jour nal of International Affairs, No. 1, 2002, pp. 98-122; Elspeeth Guild und Joanna van Selm (eds.), International Migration and Security, London 2005.
Cf. also Yannis A. Stivachtis, International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security, in: Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Br. 1, 2008, pp. 1-24 Cf. Reinhard Drifte, Migrants, Human Security and Military Security, in: Harald Kleinschmidt (ed.), Migration, Regional Integration and Human Security, Aldershot 2006.
and pull factors of migration are taken into consideration, and the causes and consequences of migrations are distinguished according to corresponding categories. The fundamental problem in these differentiations is that the categories are only assumed to be precise. In practice, economic, political, environmental and other migration factors are intermingled. The difficulties are seen, among other things, in the differences – often vitally important to those affected – between refugees (who are under the protection of the Geneva Convention Relat ing to the Status of Refugees and for whose protection the UN High Commissioner for Refu gees is mandated) and migrants (for whom there is no comparable international legal stan dard or international responsibility). A similar problem is currently developing in the debate on climate refugees.21 As important as the difference between political and other motives for migration may be for the legal protection of those affected, for this examination of the connection between migra tion and security, it is more useful to conceptualise migration as a search for security. If mi gration in general is seen as an exit option out of an insecure situation, security receives a key significance for the explanation of migration movements and their associated risks.